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JOINDER AND SEVERANCE 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
and 
Peter A. Joy 
Staff Attorney, Clinical Program 
Case Western Reserve University 
Joinder and severance issues may arise from either 
(1) the joinder of offenses allegedly committed by 
one defendant or (2) the joinder of defendants. The 
importance of joinder cannot be overestimated. As 
one commentator has noted: "The way in which the 
prosecutor chooses to combine offenses or defend-
ants in a single indictment is perhaps second in impor-
tance only to his decision to prosecute. Whether a 
defendant is tried en masse with many other partici-
pants in an alleged crime, or in a separate trial of his 
own, will often be decisive of the outcome. Equally 
decisive may be the number of offenses which are cu-
. mulated against a single defendant, particularly if 
they are unconnected." 8 Moore's Federal Practice 
8-3 ( R. Cipes ed. 1979). 
In Ohio joinder and severance are governed by the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 8 covers the join-
der of offenses and defendants in one indictment, in-
formation, or complaint. Rule 13 governs the consol-
idation for trial of offenses and defendants in situa-
tions in which there is more than one indictment, in-
formation, or complaint. Finally, Rule 14 governs sev-
erance of offenses and defendants. 
This article examines the joinder and severance of 
offenses and defendants. Some issues, however, are 
common to both types of joinder and are discussed in 
the following section. 
PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
The Relationship Between the Ohio and Federal Rules 
The joinder and severance rules found in the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure are, in many respects, 
identical to the Ohio Rules. Thus, it is not surprising 
that federal cases would provide interpretive guidance 
for issues arising under the Ohio Rules. See State v. 
Owens, 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 145,366 N.E.2d 1367, 
1375 (1975) ("[T] he construction of Fed. R. Grim. 
P. 14 by the federal courts is of help in this case."). 
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
There are, however, several important differences be-
tween the Ohio and Federal Rules that should not be 
ignored. In State v. Durham, 49 Ohio App.2d 231, 
360 N.E.2d 743 (1976), for example, the court em-
phasized that the decision to grant a severance "rests 
in the sound discretion of the [trial] court" and 
"[u] nless the discretion has been exercised to the 
manifest injury of the accused, there is no· error." /d. 
at 233, 360 N.E.2d at 746. This statement overlooks 
the explicit language of Rule 14, which specifies that 
once prejudice has been found, "the court shalf order 
an election or separate trial of counts, grant severance 
of defendants, or provide other relief as justice re-
quires" (emphasis added). In contrast, Federal Rule 
14 provides that the court may sever in the case of 
prejudice. The drafters of the Ohio Rules clearly 
made a conscious choice to limit the trial court's dis-
cretion once prejudice has been established. See State 
v. Owen, 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 145,366 N.E. 2d 
1367, 1375 (1975) ("[W] hile the federal courts have 
discretion in granting severance, our rule provides that 
if prejudice is shown 'the court shall order' sev-
erance."); 2 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal 
Law 183 ( 1974) ("By the use of the word may the 
federal courts are permitted to balance the possible 
prejudice to the defendant against convenience, while 
the use of the word shall requires Ohio courts to pro-
vide relief whenever prejudice is demonstrated."). 
The decision to make Rule 14 a mandatory rather 
than a permissive provision probably resulted from 
criticism of the federal courts' reluctance to grant sev-
erance liberally under the federal rule. See 8 Moore's 
Federal Practice and Procedure 8-4 ( R. Cipes ed. 
1979) ("Rule 14 is available, but such availability 
tends to be more theoretical than real."); 1 C. Wright, 
Federal Practice and Procedure 305 ( 1969) ("Given 
the evident reluctance of trial and appellate courts to 
grant separate trials under Rule 14, a broad interpreta-
tion of Rule 8 means broad joinder, whether or not 
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this is just or fair."). Federal authorities, therefore, 
cannot be employed in an unthinking fashion; the 
Ohio Rule was designed to overrule some of these au-
thorities. 
The Relationship Between Rules 8 and 14 
An appreciation of the relationship between Rules 
8 and 14 is fundamental to an understanding of join-
der and severance. Severance under Rule 14 requires 
a showing of prejudice. That provision, however, is 
only operable in the case of a proper joinder under 
Rule 8. If the joinder is improper (misjoinder), then 
severance is automatic, prejudice need not be shown. 
Both of the major commentators on the Federal Rules 
agree on this point. Professor Wright has written: 
"[Motions for misjoinder] raise only a question of law. 
If there has been misjoinder, the trial court has no dis-
cretion to deny the motion, and the appellate court 
may not consider the failure to do so harmless error." 
1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 337 
(1969). See also id. at 432 ("Rule 14 comes into play 
only if the original joinder was proper. It permits a 
severance, despite the propriety of the original joinder, 
if needed to avoid prejudice."). Similarly, Professor 
Moore's treatise contains the following passage: "[A] 
pleading which fails to comply with the minimum 
standards of joinder should be treated as conclusively 
prejudicial. This means that where the trial judge de-
termines that offenses or defendants have been mis-
joined, he has no discretion to deny relief." 8 Moore's 
Federal Practice 8-14 (R. Cipes ed. 1979). See U.S. v. 
Piacente, 490 F.2d 661,665 (7th Cir. 1973) ("When 
joinder is improper, severance is the appropriate reme-
dy and there is no discretion in the court's ruling.") 
This point was ignored in State v. Durham, 49 Ohio 
App.2d 231,360 N.E.2d 743 (1976), in which the 
court stated: "Where an indictment charges two or 
more distinct offenses, even if improperly joined, the 
exercise of authority to compel the prosecutor to make 
an election [or grant a severance] rests in the sound 
discretion of the court, to be exercised in the promo-
tion of justice and upon good cause shown .... " !d. 
at 233,360 N.E.2d at 746 (emphasis added). This pas-
sage is dictum because the two counts in Durham-ag-
gravated burglary and theft-were properly joined un-
der Rule 8(A) since both offenses were ;'based on the 
same act or transactions." 
Durham illustrates the necessity for counsel to in-
form the court of the precise basis for a motion to sev-
er. If there is a misjoinder, of either offenses or de-
fendants, a motion to sever shoul.d specify that Rule 8, 
rather than Rule 14, is the basis of the motion. Other-
wise, counsel may be required to establish prejudice as 
specified in Rule 14. Motions for severance based on 
misjoinder are made pursuant to Rule 12(B) (2); mo-
tions for severance based on prejudicial joinder are 
made pursuant to Rule 12(8)(5). 
Waiver 
In State v. Owens, 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 366 N.E. 
2d 1367 ( 1975), the court stated: "[T] he motion to 
sever was made before trial. It was not renewed either 
after the state rested or at the conclusion of all of the 
evidence. When not renewed, it is waived." !d. at 146, 
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366 N.E.2d at 1376. This statement is troublesome 
for several reasons. First, the Owens court cited feder-
al authorities to support its position. Its citations, 
however, were selective. The federal courts have not 
followed a uniform rule on the waiver issue. Indeed, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Shaffer v. U.S., 362 U.S. 
511 (1960), spoke of the trial judge's "continuing duty 
at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if preju-
dice does appear." !d. at 516. See also 8 Moore's 
Federal Practice 14-11 to -19 (R. Cipes ed. 1979). 
Second, Rule 12(8)(5) requires severance motions un-
der Rule 14 to be made prior to trial. Motions not 
made prior to trial are waived under subsection (G) of 
Rule 12: Therefore, the waiver issue is explicitly cov-
ered in the Rules and the Rules do not require that 
the motion be renewed during trial. Nevertheless, a 
prudent attorney should renew the motion to avoid 
any problem. 
Proof in Support of a Motion to Sever 
When making a motion to sever, counsel should 
specify the grounds on which the motion is based and 
introduce evidence or make an offer of proof in sup-
port of the motion. A mere allegation of prejudice 
will not be sufficient. Two pre-Rules cases address 
this issue. In State v. Perod, 15 Ohio App.2d 115, 239 
N.E.2d 100 (1968), the court overruled a motionto 
sever, stating: "The record shows a request by motion 
for a separate trial but a total failure to show cause." 
/d. at 122, 239 N.E.2d at 105. In State v. Fields, 29 
Ohio App.2d 154,279 N.E.2d 616 (1971), the court 
adopted a somewhat different position. According to 
that court, good cause may be shown "in any manner 
consistent with proof of motions generally, including 
a showing by the professional statement of counsel." 
/d. at 158,279 N.E.2d at 619 (emphasis added). Ex-
amples of severance motions and supporting memor-
anda are found in 9 G. Messerman, Ohio Forms of 
Pleading and Practice, Criminal Rules ( 1979). 
JOINDER AND SEVERANCE OF OFFENSES 
Rule 8(A) provides: 
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same 
indictment, information or complaint in a separate count 
for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies 
or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar char-
acter, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are 
based on two or more acts or transactions connected 
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or 
plan, or part of a course of criminal conduct. 
Duplicity, Multiplicity, and Crimes of Similar Import 
S~ction 8(A) prohibits the misjoinder of offenses-
the unauthorized charging of unrelated offenses in an 
indictment. This section also prohibits duplicitous 
charging-charging two offenses in the same count of 
an indictment. A related problem is known as multi-
plicitous charging. Multiplicity is the opposite of du-
plicity; it is the charging of a single crime in multiple 
counts. While the problems of duplicity and multi-
plicity are beyond the scope of this article, it should 
be noted that the Ohio Multiple Counts Statute, R.C. 
2941.25, which provides that a defendant can be con-
victed of only one offense if charged with "two or 
more allied offenses of similar import" based on the 
same conduct, is directed at a related problem-the 
prevention of multiple convictions for a single trans-
action. See State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St.2d 224, 364 
N.E.2d 224 (1977), vacated, 438 U.S. 911 (1978); 
State v. Osborne, 49 Ohio St.2d 135,359 N.E.2d 78 
(1976); Maumee v. Geiger, 45 Ohio St. 2d 238,344 
N.E.2d 133 (1976); State v. Fisher, 52 Ohio App.2d 
133, 368 N.E.2d 324 (1977). 
Misjoinder of Offenses 
The most troublesome aspect of joinder under Rule 
8(A) concerns joinder of offenses "of the same or sim-
ilar character," which are not part of a single scheme 
or plan. This is because the rationale underlying the 
joinder of offenses-"avoiding duplicitous, time-
consuming trials in which the same factual and legal 
issues must be litigated"-is not applicable in this in-
stance. ABA Standards Relating to Joinder and Sev-
erance 29 (1968). "[S] ince the offenses on trial are 
distinct, trial of each is likely to require its own evi-
dence and witnesses. The time spent where similar 
offenses are joined may not be as long as two trials, 
but the time saved by impaneTiing only one jury and 
by setting the defendant's background only once seems 
minimal." Note, joint and Single Trials Under Rules 
8 and 7 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
74 Yale L.J. 553, 560 (1965). While the Rule permits 
joinder of the same or similar offenses, the absence of 
strong policy reasons for this type of joinder should 
be considered by a court in ruling on a motion to sev-
er offenses because of prejudice under Rule 14. See 
ABA Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance § 
2.2(a) (1968) (providing for severance as a matter of 
right when the same or similar offenses are joined). 
Prejudicial Joinder 
If offenses are properly joined pursuant to Rule 
8(A), the defendant may nonetheless seek a severance 
pursuant to Rule 14. If prejudice is established, the 
court must grant the motion. Under some circum-
stances joinder of offenses may accrue to a defend-
ant's advantage. As two commentators have pointed 
out: "Being called upon to defend himself in anum-
ber of trials may be harrassing to a defendant and be 
a disadvantage far outweighing the prejudice which 
may result from a joinder. It is possible for the pros-
ecutor to withhold some of the charges and file them 
as detainers, thus making it difficult for defendant to 
get parole." Remington & Joseph, Charging, Convict-
ing, and Sentencing the Multiple Criminal Offender, 
1961 Wis. L. Rev. 528, 538-39. Furthermore, join-
der of offenses may result in concurrent sentences. 
Orfield, A Note on joinder of Offenses, 41 Ore. L. 
Rev. 128, 130 (1962). If the prosecutor obtains sep-
arate indictments in order: to try a defendant several 
times for related offenses, the defendant may move to 
consolidate under Rule 13. Moreover, the prosecutor 
runs the risk that the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
may preclude a second trial if the defendant is ac-
quitted at the first trial. See generally, Katz, Double 
Jeopardy, 2 Public Defender Rptr. (July-August 1979). 
In Drew v. U.S., 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. 1964), the court 
-·outlined how a defendant could be prejudiced by the 
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joinder of offenses. 
The argument against joinder is that the defendant may 
be prejudiced for one or more of the following reasons: 
( 1) he may become embarrassed or confounded in pre-
senting separate defenses; (2) the jury may use the evi-
dence of one of the crimes charged to infer a criminal dis-
position on the part of the defendant from which is 
found his guilt of the other crime or crimes charged; or 
(3) the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various 
crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separate-
ly, it would not so find. A less tangible but perhaps equal-
ly persuasive element of prejudice may reside in a latent 
feeling of hostility engendered by the charging of several 
crimes as distinct from only one. ld at 88. 
See also McElroy v. U.S., 164 U.S. 76,80 (1896) 
("[T] he multiplication of distinct charges has been 
considered so objectionable as tending to confound 
the accused in his defense, or to prejudice him as to 
his challenges, in the matter of being held out to be ha-
bitually criminal, in the distraction of the attention of 
the jury, or otherwise, that it is the settled rule in Eng-
land and in many of our States, to confine the indict-
ment to one distinct offense or restrict the evidence to 
one transaction."). 
The first type of prejudice is illustrated by Cross v. 
U.S., 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964), in which the de-
fendant was charged with two counts of robbery. Pri-
or to trial the defendant moved to sever the two of-
fenses so that he could testify on one count but not 
the other. The denial of the motion was held to be re-
versible error. 
If he testifies on one count, he runs the risk that any ad-
verse effects will influence the jury's consideration of the 
other count. Thus he bears the risk on both counts, al-
though he may benefit on only one. Moreover, a defend-
ant's silence on one count would be damaging in the face 
of this express denial of the other. Thus he may be co-·-
erced into testifying on the count upon which he wished 
to remain silent. It is not necessary to decide whether 
this invades his constitutional right to remain silent, since 
we think it constitutes prejudice within the meaning of 
Rule 14. /d. at 989. 
See also U.S. v. Piacente, 490 F .2d 661, 662 (7th Cir. 
1973); People v. Edwards, 63 111.2d 134,345 N.E.2d 
496 (1976). 
A second type of prejudice involves the possibility 
that the jury will convict because the defendant pos-
sesses a criminal disposition. Shielding the defendant 
from this possibility underlies the rule, long recognized 
in Ohio, that the state may not introduce evidence of 
the defendant's bad character or reputation unless the 
defendant first introduces evidence of his good charac-
ter. See State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 402, 358 
N.E.2d 623,630 (1976); State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio 
St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949). Even if evidence of a 
defendant's bad character is not introduced, the jury 
may nonetheless infer a bad character or criminal dis-
position because multiple offenses are tried together. 
Severance, however, may not obviate this problem be-
cause even if the offenses are tried separately, the 
state may be permitted to introduce evidence of the 
severed offenses under the Similar Acts statute. R .C. 
2945.59. In this event, the defendant would still face 
the risk that the jury would improperly infer criminal 
disposition. See State v. Owens, 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 
366 N.E.2d 1367 (1975). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the joinder requirements of Rule 8(A} are 
broader than the admissibility requirements of the 
Similar Acts statute; in many cases evidence of other 
crimes would not be admissible in a separate trial. See 
U.S. v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1976) (similar 
acts rule not applicable; severance required because in-
ference of criminal disposition was prejudicial). For a 
discussion of the Similar Acts statute, see Giannelli, 
Character Evidence, 2 Public Defender Rptr. (March-
April1979). 
Joinder of offenses is also prejudicial if the jury cu-
mulates the evidence. "We all know that, if you can 
pile up a number of charges against a man, it is quite 
often the case that the jury will convict, where, if they 
were listening to the evidence on one charge only, they 
would find it wholly insufficient .... " Maguire, Pro-
posed New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 23 
Ore. L. Rev. 56, 58-59 (1943). Gregory v. U.S., 369 
F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966), exemplifies this point. In 
reversing the defendant's conviction, the court com-
mented: "The point is that a severance should have 
been granted because ... the joinder was prejudicial 
under Rule 14 .... Here there was not only the dan-
ger of the evidence with respect to the two robberies 
cumulating in the jurors' minds tending to prove the 
defendant guilty of each, but the evidence as to one of 
the robberies was so weak as to lead one to question its 
sufficiency to go to the jury. Thus its primary useful-
ness in this trial was to support the Government's case 
as to the robbery which resulted in the murder." /d. 
at 189. See also U.S. v. Carter, 475 F .2d 349 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973); State v. Jonas, 363 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Conn. 
1975). 
JOINDER AND SEVERANCE OF DEFENDANTS 
Rule 8(B) provides: 
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same 
indictm~nt, information or complaint if they are alleged 
to have participated in the same act or transaction or in 
the same series of acts or transactions constituting an of-
fense or offenses, or in the same course of criminal con-
duct! Such defendants may be charged in one or more 
counts together or separately and all of the defendants 
need not be charged in each count. 
Section 8(B) differs from section 8(A) in one impor-
tant respect. Section (A) permits the joinder of of-
fenses that"are of the same or similar character." A 
comparable provision relating to the joinder of defend-
ants does not appear in section (B); defendants may 
be tried together only if they are alleged to have par-
ticipated in the same acts or transactions or in the 
same course of criminal conduct. Moreover, sections 
(A) and (B) operate independently of each other. 
Thus, if X has committed one robbery by himself and 
a second robbery withY, all charges cannot be tried 
at one time because Y did not participate in the first 
robbery. The prosecutor could try X alone for both 
robberies by' joining offenses under section (A), in 
which case Y would .be tried separately for the second 
robbery. Alternatively, X and Y could be tried jointly 
under section (B) for the second robbery, in which 
case X would be tried alone for the first robbery. 
If codefendants are properly joined pursuant to 
Rule 8(B), severance may nevertheless be required un-
der Rule 14, provided prejudice is established. The 
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meaning of the term prejudice in this context involves 
a number of different factors, some of which are exam-
ined in the following sections. 
Confessions of Codefendants 
The admission in a joint trial of a codefendant's 
confession which implicates the accused is an example 
of prejudice under Rule 14. Because the U.S. Supreme 
Court has decided several cases involving this issue on 
Sixth Amendment grounds, the nonconstitutional an-
alysis of Rule 14 prejudice has been overshadowed. In 
Delli Paoli v. U.S., 352 U.S. 232 (1957), the Court up-
held the practice of introducing a codefendant's con-
fession in a joint trial because the Court was willing to 
assume that the jury would follow the trial court's in-
struction to consider the confession only in deciding 
the guilt of the codefendant. By 1968 the Court was 
no longer willing to subscribe to this assumption. In 
Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court wrote: 
"[T] here are some contexts in which the risk that the 
jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so 
great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the 
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of 
the jury system cannot be ignored .... Such a context 
is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating 
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands 
accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberate-
ly spread before the jury in a joint trial." /d. at·135-
36. Once the Court concluded that there existed a 
"substantial risk that the jury, despite the cautionary 
instruction to the contrary, looked to the incriminat-
ing extrajudicial statements in determining the petition-
er's guilt," it ruled that the defendant had been denied 
his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because 
his right to cross-examine the codefendant about the 
statement had been foreclosed. Subsequently, the 
Court held Bruton applicable in state trials, Roberts 
v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), and subject to the 
harmless error doctrine, Harrington v. California, 395 
U.S. 250 ( 1969). Ohio cases discussing Bruton include 
State v. Utsler, 21 Ohio App.2d 167, 255 N.E.2d 861 
(1970); State v. Parsons, 18 Ohio App.2d 123, 123 n. 
1, 247 N.E.2d 482, 483 n.1 (1969). 
The simplest way to avoid the Bruton problem is 
for the prosecutor to try the defendants separately or 
to refrain from offering the codefendant's statement 
in evidence. Bruton, however, can be avoided in sev-
eral other ways. First, redaction or deletion of all ref-
erences to the defendant which appear in the code-
fendant's statement would satisfy Bruton. While the 
Bruton majority acknowledged this possibility in a 
footnote, the acknowledgment could be characterized 
as unenthusiastic because in the same footnote the 
Court cited authorities "suggesting that deletions (re-
daction) from the confession are ineffective .... " 
391 U.S. at 134 n.1 0. In his dissent, Justice White e-
laborated on the pitfalls of this procedure: "Effective 
deletion will probably require not only omission of all 
direct and indirect inculpations of codefendants but 
also of any statement that could be employed against 
those defendants once their identity is otherwise estab-
lished. Of course, the deletion must not be such that 
it will distort the statements to the substantial preju-
dice of either the declarant or the government." !d. 
at 143. The ABA CriminaiJustice Standards also com-
ment on these problems: "There are, of course, in-
stances in which such editing is not possible; the ref-
erences to the codefendant may be so frequent or so 
closely interrelated with references to the maker's con-
;2\'J duct that little would be left of the statement after ed-
·-· iting." ABA Standards Relating to Joinder and Sever-
ance 38 (1968). 
Second, the Bruton problem can be avoided at 
feast in some instances, if the codefendant testlfies at 
trial. Under these circumstances the defendant would 
have the opportunity to cross-examine the codefend-
ant on the accuracy of the out-of-court statement, 
thereby removing the confrontation issue. The Su-
preme Court took this position in Nelson v. O'Neill, 
402 U.S. 622 (1971 ): "We conclude that where a co-
defendant takes the stand in his own defense, denies 
making an alleged out-of-court statement implicating 
the defendant, and proceeds to testify favorably to the 
defendant concerning the underlying facts, the defend-
ant has been denied no rights protected by the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments." /d. at 629-30. See al-
so State v. Doherty, 56 Ohio App.2d 112, 381 N.E.2d 
960 (1978). Eliminating tfie Bruton problem in this 
way, however, is of little help to the prosecutor at the 
time a motion to sever is made because the prosecutor 
has no way of knowing or discovering whether the co-
defendant will waive his Fifth Amendment right and 
testify at trial. Furthermore, the Nelson rationale 
would be inapplicable if both defendants were repre-
sented by the same attorney because cross-examination 
of the testifying codefendant would present a conflict 
of interest. See Courtney v. U.S., 486 F .2d 1108 (9th -~ Cir. 1973); Hofland v. Henderson, 460 F .2d 978 (5th 
Cir. 1972); Baker v. Wainwright, 422 F.2d 145 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970). 
Third, some courts have held that Bruton does not 
apply when both defendants have confessed, implicat-
ing each other. See Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513 
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970). 
The Supreme Court considered, but did not resolve, 
the issue in Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979). 
The plurality opinion in Parker took the position that 
--Bruton was not applicable to cases involving interlock-
ing confessions. Justice Stevens, joined by two other 
Justices, dissented. The dissenting opinion criticized 
two assumptions which supported the plurality opinion. 
"First, [the plurality opinion] assumes that the 
jury's ability to disregard a codefendant's inadmissible 
and highly prejudicial confession is invariably increas-
ed by the existence of a corroborating statement by 
the defendant. Second, it assumes that all unchalleng-
ed confessions by a defendant are equally reliable." /d. 
at 2145. Justice Powell did not participate in the de-
- ~ision, and Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the 
JUdgment on harmless error grounds, disagreed with 
the plurality's position. Thus, there exists a 4-4 split 
on this issue with Justice Powell's position unknown. 
The Sixth Circuit, however, has taken the position that 
-~·the Bruton rule applies to interlocking confessions. I; See Hodges v. Rose, 570 F .2d 643 (6th Cir. 1978); ac-
.:cord, U.S. v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). 
Finally, the codefendant's confession in Bruton was 
inadmissible against the accused under the hear-
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say rule. If the codefendant's statement fell within 
the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the 
Bruton problem would apparently be obviated; in a 
footnote in Bruton, the Court stated: "We emphasize 
that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was 
clearly inadmissible against him under traditional rules 
of evidence ... There is not before us, therefore, any 
recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as pe-
titioner is concerned and we intimate no view whatever 
that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under 
the Confrontation Clause." 391 U.S. at 128 n.3. In 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 ( 1970), the Court exam-
ined the confrontation problems associated with the co-
conspirator exception. Although the Court upheld a 
liberal interpretation of the coconspirator exception in 
Dutton, the Court did not take the position that state-
ments falling within that exception automatically pass 
constitutional muster. Instead the Court scrutinized 
the statement to determine whether it possessed suffi-
cient "indicia of reliability." This is consistent with 
the Court's approach in other cases. See California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970) ("[I] ndeed, we 
have more than once found a violation of confronta-
tion values even though the statements in issue were 
admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay excep-
tion."). Thus, the availability of the coconspirator ex-
ception may remove the Bruton issue, but it would 
not necessarily dispose of all confrontation issues. 
State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339,86 N.E.2d 24 
(1949), decided by the Ohio Supreme Court prior to 
Bruton, should also be noted. In Rosen, the Court re-
versed a conviction because a codefendant's confession 
was admitted during a joint trial. The Court comment-
ed: "The fact must be recognized ... that in many 
cases the admission of such ex parte statements creates 
impressions so adverse that they may not be eradicated 
from the minds of the members of the jury. The pre-
judicial matter should be striken out or deleted before 
the confession is admitted in evidence." /d. at 342; 
86 N.E.2d at 26. Rosen is significant because the Ohio 
Supreme Court did not rely on the confrontation 
clause as was the case in Bruton; instead, the Court 
was construing a joinder statute which was a forerun-
ner of Rule 14. Thus, even if an appellate court should 
find that confrontation guarantees have not been vio-
lated, either because the codefendant testified or be-
cause interlocking confessions were introduced, the 
prejudicial impact of the statement on the minds of 
the jury may require reversal. See also State v. Shafer 
71 Ohio App. 1, 47 N.E.2d 669 (1942). ' 
One other procedural point deserves attention. 
Rule 14 requires the court, in ruling on a motion for 
severance, to "order the prosecuting attorney to deliv-
er to the court for inspection pursuant to Rule 16(B) 
(1) (a) any statements or confessions made by the de-
fendants which the state intends to introduce in evi-
dence at trial." 
Antagonistic Defenses 
" [I] t has long been the view that defendants joined 
for trial should be granted a severance whenever their 
defenses are antagonistic to each other." ABA Stand-
ards Relating to Joinder and Severance 41 ( 1968). 
The problem presented by antagonistic defenses is if-
lustrated by Deluna v. U.S., 308 F .2d 140 (5th Cir. 
1962), in which two defendants were tried jointly for 
narcotics offenses. One of the defendants, Gomez, 
moved for severance prior to trial, but the motion 
was denied. Although the second defendant, Deluna, 
did not testify at trial, Gomez took the stand and 
blamed Deluna for the offense. In closing argument, 
Gomez' counsel commented that "at least one man 
was honest enough and had courage enough to take 
the stand and subject himself to cross-examination .. 
. You haven't heard a. word from [Deluna]." /d. at 
143. This tactic apparently worked-Gomez was ac-
quitted, Deluna convicted. On appeal the Fifth-Cir-
cuit reversed Deluna's conviction. The court believed 
that Gomez' attorney had acted properly; "his attor-
neys should be free to draw all rational inferences 
from the failure of a codefendant to testify, just as an 
attorney is free to comment on the effect of any inter-
ested party's failure to produce materia_! evidence in 
his possession or to call Vl{itnesses who have knowledge 
of pertinent facts." /d. Nevertheless, from Deluna's 
perspective, the comments prejudiced the exercise of 
his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. This con-
flict could have been avoided; the court noted, "for 
each of the defendants to see the face of Justice they 
must be tried separately." /d. at 155. 
One Ohio appellate court has recognized this prob-
lem. In State v. Parsons, 18 Ohio App.2d 123, 247 
N.E.2d 482 (1969), the court observed: "[I] tis easy 
to imagine further complications in a consolidated tri-
al. For example, suppose one defendant takes the 
stand and the other does not. Is the failure to testify 
subject to comment by the lawyer for the testifying 
codefendant?" /d. at 124 n.2, 247 N.E.2d at 483 n.2. 
Although the court did not have to answer this ques-
tion to decide that case, it did give some inkling as to 
how it would have decided the issue when it stated: 
"This court unanimously disapproves the consolida-
tion as not consonant with good practice in criminal 
trials .... " /d. at 123, 247 N.E.2d at 483. 
Other examples of reversals of joint trials because 
of antagonistic defenses include People v. Hurst, 396 
Mich. 1, 9, 238 N.W.2d 6, 10 (1976) (joint trial im-
proper because one defendant "would testify to excul-
pate herself and incriminate [the other] "); Murray v. 
State, 528 P.2d 739, 740 (Okla. Cr. 1974) ("Denial of 
a severance in the instant case resulted in pitting de-
fendant against co-defendant."); People v. Braune,363 
Ill. 551, 557, 2 N.E.2d 839, 842 (1936) ("Any set of 
circumstances which is sufficient to deprive a defend-
ant of a fair trial if tried jointly with another is suffi-
cient to require a separate trial."). See also Anno., 70 
A. L. R. 1171 , 11 84-85 ( 1931 ) . 
Codefendant's Exculpatory Testimony 
In some cases defendants have been prejudiced be-
cause a joint trial precluded them from calling code-
fendants who could have provided exculpatory evi-
dence. The leading case is U.S. v. Echeles, 352 F .2d 
892 (7th Cir. 1965), in which the defendant was charg-
ed with suborning perjury, impeding the administra-
tion of justice, and conspiracy. Echeles' codefendant 
had previously testified in another trial that Echeles 
was not involved in the events upon which the present 
charges were based. Echeles moved for a severance so 
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that the codefendant would testify in his behalf. The 
trial court denied the motion; the Seventh Circuit re-
versed. Under the circumstances of that case, the 
court found that (1) the trial court could have order-
ed the codefendant tried first, and (2) Echeles "should 1 
not be foreclosed of the possibility that [the codefend-
ant] would testify in his behalf ... " merely because 
the codefendant might claim his Fifth Amendment 
privilege even if separate trials were ordered. /d. at 
898. 
A mere allegation that the defendant contemplates 
calling a codefendant is insufficient. This has been 
the holding in the federal cases as well as in State v. 
Perod, 15 Ohio App.2d 115, 239 N.E.2d 100 (1968). 
Thus, counsel should disclose the exculpatory effect 
of the codefendant's anticipated testimony as well as 
the basis for believing why the codefendant would tes-
tify if severance is granted. 
Support for the Echeles rule is found in U.S. v. Mar-
tinez 486 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Shuford, 
454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971 ); Byrd v. Wainwright, 
428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970); U.S. v. Gay, 567 F.2d 
916,921 (9th Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Gleason, 259 F. 
Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
Guilt by Association 
In some cases the accumulation of evidence against 
one defendant may spill over on other defendants, re-
sulting in a conviction of the latter even though the e-
vidence against that defendant is weak or marginal-in 
short, guilt by association. In United States v. Kelly, 
349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.1965),cert. denied, 384 U.S. 
94 7 ( 1966), the Second Circuit reversed a conviction 
on this ground, commenting that severance should 
have been granted "the moment it appeared that [the 
defendant] was likely to be prejudiced by the accumu-
lation of evidence of wrongdoing by his codefendant." 
/d. at 756 (citing Fed~ R. Crim. P. 14). 
Kelly was followed in U.S. v. Mardian, 546 F .2d 
973 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Mardian, one of the Watergate 
defendants, was tried along with Haldeman, Ehrlich-
man and Mitchell. His alleged participation in the 
Watergate coverup was minor compared to that of the 
more well-known codefendants. On appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit reversed because Mardian's motion to sever 
was not granted during trial. The court commented: 
"Particularly where there is a great disparity in the 
weight of the evidence, strongly establishing the guilt 
of some defendants, the danger persists that guilt will 
improperly 'rub off' on the others." /d. at 977. 
Complexity 
Where the number of charges and defendants is so 
numerous that the jury will be incapable of distinguish-
ing the evidence and applying the law to each defend-
ant separately, a severance should be granted. This 
problem is illustrated by U.S. v. Moreton, 25 F.R.D. 
262 (W.D.N.Y. 1960), in which the trial court granted 
a severance, stating: "The complex involvement of 
the various defendants and the multiplicity of charges 
contained in the indictment would render it difficult, 
if not impossible, for the court to adequately charge a 
jury as to the applicable law with respect to each de- -
fendant and for the jury to apply that law intelligently 
in reaching verdicts on the many charges involved." /d. 
at 263. For an Ohio case which reversed a defendant's 
conviction on this ground, see City of Cincinnati v. 
Reichman, 27 Ohio App.2d 125, 272 N.E.2d 904 
~ (1971 ). 
Capital Offenses 
In contrast to its federal counterpart, Ohio.Rule 14 
contains a provision specifically covering severance in 
capital cases: "When two or more persons are jointly 
indicted for a capital offense, each of such persons 
shall be tried separately, unless the court orders the de-
fendants to be tried jointly, upon application by the 
prosecuting attorney or one or more of the defendants, 
and for good cause shown." In effect, this provision 
presumes prejudice in joint trials of capital offenses. 
This provision follows R.C. 2945.20 and thus, cases 
interpreting that provision are still persuasive authority. 
The burden of establishing good cause for a joint trial 
in a capital case rests on the prosecutor. See State v. 
Abbott, 152 Ohio St. 228, 89 N.E.2d 147 (1949); 
State v. Fields, 29 Ohio App.2d 154,279 N.E.2d 
(1971 ). 
In establishing good cause, the Ohio Supreme Court 
has stated: "[G] ood cause must necessarily be some 
operative factor not present in every case of joint in-
dictments of defendants in capital cases. For instance, 
the additional time and labor required of the state or 
court, or the expense to the state, made necessary by 
separate trials, cannot be assigned or considered as good 
cause." State v. Abbott, 152 Ohio St. 228, 236, 89 
N.E.2d 147, 151 ( 1949). See also State v. Dingledine, 
28 Ohio L. Abs. 685, 687-88, 33 N.E.2d 660, 662-63 
(Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 135 Ohio St. 251,20 
N.E.2d 6367 (1939) (crowded dockets insufficient to 
establish good cause.). Administrative and economic 
reasons for a joint trial were also rejected in State v. 
Richardson, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 608, 54 N.E.2d 160 (Ct. 
App. 1943). The court went on to hold, however, 
that joinder was proper under the circumstances of 
that case because it "enable[d] the jury to have a 
clearer insight into the testimony and enable[d] it to 
arrive more intelligently at a proper conclusion." /d. 
at 613, 54 N.E.2d at 162. See also State v. Jenkins, 
76 Ohio App. 277, 64 N.E.2d 86, appeal dismissed, 
144 Ohio St. 638,60 N.E.2d 182 (1945). In Gregory 
v. U.S., 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966), however, the 
court observed: "It may be seriously questioned 
whether it is proper in any capital case to join for trial 
offenses occurring at different times and places. The 
danger arising from the cumulative effect of other of-
fenses on the minds of the jurors is too great to toler-
ate in such cases." /d. at 189. Similarly, the danger 
of prejudice arising from a joinder of defendants may 
also be "too great to tolerate" in capital cases. 
Failure to object to joinder in capital cases may 
constitute a waiver. See State v. Williams, 85 Ohio 
App. 236,88 N.E.2d 20 (1947); State v. Bohannon, 
64 Ohio App. 431,28 N.E.2d 1010 (1940). 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Prior Convictions of Government Witnesses 
A prior conviction with which a prosecution wit-
ness might be impeached must be supplied to a crim-
inal defendant upon request, according to the D.C. 
Circuit. The Court found that the "premises" of 
Brady v. Maryland, 393 U.S. 83 (1963), and U.S. v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), require the government to 
produce upon request evidence material to the out-
come of the case. In light of the difficulty of showing 
how impeachment evidence may be material to the 
guilt or innocence of the particular defendant, the 
Court applied a per se rule dispensing with a showing 
of materiality in each case. The Court stated: "[T] he 
integrity of the criminal trial process requires uniform-
ity of access to impeachable convictions of govern-
ment witnesses when requested." Lewis v. U.S., 25 
Crim. L. Rptr. 2032 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979). 
Stop and Frisk 
The Eighth Circuit held that the random pedestrian 
stop of the defendant Vl(hich turned up a concealed 
handgun was impermissible under the Fourth Amend-
ment. The police officer had been ordered to intensi-
fy his evening patrol because of racially-motivated 
gang fights in the neighborhood during the day, and 
did so by means of "field interviews" of random pe-
destrians. During one such stop, the weapon was dis-
covered. Citing Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 
(1979), and Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979), 
the Court held that "generalized racial unrest cannot 
obviate the requirement that law officers 'have a rea-
sonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the 
individual [seized] is involved in criminal activity.'" 
U.S. v. Palmer, 25 Crim. L. Rptr. 2455 (8th Cir. 1979). 
Plea Negotiations 
When plea negotiations in an assault case were un-
successful, the defendant was reindicted for assault 
with intent to kill while armed. The D.C. Court of 
Appeals reversed the conviction, citing North Carolina 
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), and Blackledge v. 
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), for the rule that due pro-
cess forbids a defendant from being forced to waive 
his rights out of fear of a harsher penalty due to pros-
ecutorial vindictiveness. The Court minimized the im-
portance of Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 
(1978), which had allowed the addition of a more se-
rious charge upon the defendant's failure to plead guil-
ty. Washington v. U.S., 25 Cr. L. Rptr. 2499 (D.C. 
Ct. App. 1979). 
Impoundment of Automobiles 
The Court held that an automobile may not be im-
pounded by police when other alternatives, such as 
entrusting it to the driver's companion or locking it in 
a safe place, are available. The conviction had been 
based upon an inventory search of the impounded au-
to after the driver was stopped for drunk driving. The 
Court rejected prosecution arguments that the defend-
ant's intoxication made him per se incompetent to en-
trust the auto to his sober passenger, since "it is the de-
gree of the driver's intoxication that should be deter-
minative of this issue." The State's failure affirmative-
ly to show such incompetence invalidated the search. 
Drinkard v. State, 25 Cr. L. Rptr. 2477 (Tenn. Sup. 
Ct. 1979). 
General Search 
Pursuant to a warrant, F.B.I. agents entered and 
searched defendant's offices for stolen files and docu-
ments. The agents seized several hundred documents, 
far more than the 148 specifically described in the war-
rant. Many of the documents seized were admittedly 
"innocuous" and nearly half could "by no stretch of 
the imagination" be regarded as within the warrant's 
designated categories of documents to be seized. The 
Court found the mere return of non-incriminating i-
tems to be an 'inadequate remedy. Consequently, the 
Court held that the warrant was improperly executed 
and suppressed all seized evidence as the fruit of an im-
permissible general search. In reSearch Warrant 
(Church of Scientology), 25 Grim. L. Rptr. 2525 (U.S. 
Dist. Ct., D.C. 1979). 
Improper Comment-Harmless Error 
The Sixth Circuit discussed the requirements of the 
harmless error rule in the context of a prosecutor's 
comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Accord-
ing to the Court, several factors are relevant: the ex-
tent of the prosecutor's improper comments, the 
strength of the case against the defendant, the efficacy 
of corrective jury instructions, and the number of other 
errors at trial. Although the State had a strong case a-
gainst the defendant, the eyidence was not overwhelm-
ing nor undisputed. In light of other errors and the 
trial court's failure to give a curative instruction, the 
prosecutor's comment was deemed prejudicial error, 
and the defendant's convktion was reversed. Eberhardt 
v. Bordenkircher, 26 Grim. L. Rptr. 2036 (6th Cir. 
1979). 
Reporter's Notes 
On First Amendment grounds, the Court denied 
the .. defendants' subpoena for materials gathered by a 
reporter for use in a book. The defendants claimed 
that the materials would yield information about two 
F.B.I. searches of their premises. Relying on the con-
curring opinion of Justice Powell in Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 ( 1972), the Court applied a bal-
ancing test to find the materials privileged: "the report-
er is protected from the subpoena power of a criminal 
defendant unless the information is necessary to a fair 
hearing and there are no alternative avenues for access 
to the information in the reporter's possession." U.S. 




The Sixth Circuit held that a magistrate's faiiure to 
place under oath an FBI agent seeking a telephonic 
warrant prior to taking his testimony, rendered the 
warrant invalid. Although the agent was sworn at 
some point during the conversation, the Court held 
that such an oath cannot be considered "to relate 
back to the testimony already supplied." The strict 
reading of the rule was based upon the clear Congres-
sional purpose "to impress on the telephone caller the 
solemnity of the proceeding in spite of the lack of for-
mal appearance before a court." U.S. v. Shorter, 25 
Grim. L. Rptr. 2356 (6th Cir. 1979). 
Parental Consent to Search 
The Court held that the warrantless search by po-
lice of the bedroom of a 17 year old youth violated 
his privilege against unreasonable search and seizure, 
although a parent had consented to the search. The 
decision was based strictly upon the State Constitu-
tion, but referred to U.S. Supreme Court language to 
support its holding .. Noting the decreasing importance 
of parental consent in the areas of abortion and treat-
ment of mental disorders, the Court stated, "it would 
be incongruous to conclude that parents, for good rea-
son or no reason, may summarily waive their child's 
right to search and seizure protections." In re Scott, 
25 Grim. L. Rptr. 1043 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1979). 
Impeachment Exception 
Subsequent to his arrest for armed robbery, police 
elicited incriminating evidence from the defendant in 
violation of his Miranda rights. In a pretrial hearing 
the trial court ruled that the defendant's statement 
could be used to impeach him on cross-examination, 
even though his dires::t testimony did not refer to the 
statement. The First Circuit reversed the conviction, 
even though the trial court's ruling had been made in 
advance and the defendant consequently never took 
the stand. Said the Court, "A concrete issue existed 
at the time the rulin~ was made and, in our view, is 
no less present now because the immediate resolu-
tion of that issue caused [the defendant] not to testi-
fy." U.S. v. Hickey, 25 Grim. L. Rptr. 2178 (1st Cir. 
1979). 
Security Guard Interrogation 
The New York Court of Appeals held that Miranda 
warnings must be given to a suspect being questioned 
by private store detectives under certain circum-
stances. The. Court held that extensive police involve-
ment in a suspect's arrest may create a custodial at-
mosphere, although the actual questioning is done by 
private security guards. In a case where police offi-
cers actively participated in the arrest, identifying 
themselves to the suspect as police officers and escort-
ing the suspect to the interrogation room, Miranda 
warnings were necessary. People v. jones, 25 Grim. L. 
Rptr. 2384 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979). 
